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Abstract
Two players, A and B, bargain to divide a perfectly divisible pie. In
a bargaining model with constant discount factors, δA and δB, we extend
Rubinstein (1982)’s alternating offers procedures to more general determin-
istic procedures so that any player in any period can be the proposer. We
show that each bargaining game with a deterministic procedure has a unique
subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) payoff outcome, which is efficient. Con-
versely, each efficient division of the pie can be supported as an SPE out-
come by some procedure if δA + δB ≥ 1, while almost no division can ever
be supported in SPE if δA + δB < 1.
Keywords: noncooperative bargaining, subgame perfect equilibrium, bar-
gaining procedure
JEL Classification: C78
1 Introduction
In two-player noncooperative bargaining theory, the most often used bargaining
procedure is the alternating offers procedure discussed by St˚ahl (1972), Rubinstein
(1982) and many followers. In this procedure, a player (proposer) suggests a di-
vision of a pie in each period, and the rejection of this offer will lead the game
to the next period when the other player becomes the proposer. This bargaining
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procedure has many obvious advantages over other procedures. It is quite natu-
ral to model everyday bargaining activities with this procedure. In addition, the
stationary structure1 of an infinite-horizon alternating offers procedure makes it
relatively easy to analyze. In particular, Rubinstein (1982)’s seminal paper shows
that a bargaining game with such a procedure has a unique subgame perfect equi-
librium outcome. Shaked and Sutton (1984), Fudenberg and Levine (1983) provide
some alternative proofs of Rubinstein’s conclusion in the special case of common
discount factor.
Although the alternating offers procedure is important, sometimes it is neces-
sary to study more general bargaining procedures, mainly because this procedure
is overly simple and lack the flexibility to handle more complex situations. We
provide two examples below.
First, sometimes it is important to understand how bargaining outcomes are
related to procedures. In other words, one may wonder to what extent different
bargaining procedures could result in different bargaining outcomes. An example is
the noncooperative implementation of cooperative solutions, which is often referred
to as the Nash program2. It is natural to ask which cooperative outcomes in a
bilateral bargaining situation can be sustained as noncooperative equilibria, using
appropriate bargaining procedures.
Second, in reality, bargaining procedures are sometimes not exogenously given,
but are endogenously determined. For example, the players in a bargaining game
will first negotiate the bargaining protocol before the actual bargaining takes place.
They will do so to achieve a better bargaining position3. A person (called the de-
signer) who has the authority to design the bargaining procedure will choose a
procedure to influence the bargaining outcome in her best interest. In such cases,
the players (or the designer) would like to know the outcomes that different proce-
dures may lead to before bargaining for (or designing) the bargaining procedure.
The literature has emphasized the important role that procedures play in bi-
lateral bargaining models, and has discussed many specific procedures. Here I
only list a few of them. Osborne and Rubinstein (1990, 1994), and Muthoo (1999)
1For any t, the subgame that starts from period t+ 2 has exactly the same structure as that
which starts from period t.
2See, among others, Nash (1953), Binmore et al. (1986), Ju and Wettstein (2009).
3See, for example, Fershtman (1990), Anesi and Seidmann (2014).
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mention some specific procedures such as repeated offers, simultaneous offers, and
random procedures. Muthoo (1990) allows the proposer to withdraw an offer even
after his opponent has already accepted it.
Following the above literature, this paper tries to generalize the alternating
offers procedure in a specific way. For a two-player (A and B) noncooperative
bargaining games with constant discount factors δA and δB, we allow a player
to successively make offers for several periods according to an exogenously given
protocol before the other player begins to propose. In other words, one player is
assigned as the proposer in each period of the game according to a deterministic
(not random) procedure, which is common knowledge to both players. No further
assumptions are placed on the procedure; it can be finite, infinite, stationary, or
non-stationary.
Note that these procedures are an extension of the alternating offers procedure,
and are fully general within the class of deterministic protocols. However, we do
not consider random procedures where the proposer in some period is assigned
stochastically, since in reality randomization mechanisms are not always available
in determining bargaining procedure. In addition, our generalization is essentially
different from changing the factors involving players’ time preference, such as dis-
count factors or the time interval between two adjacent periods4. This is because
players’ time preference is by nature exogenously given, while bargaining proce-
dures at least have the potential to be endogenously determined, although in this
paper we simply assume them to be exogenously given.
A natural question is whether bargaining games with deterministic general
procedures still possess some good theoretical properties. After introducing the
basic model and some notations in Sections 2 and 3, we prove in Section 4 that
the existence, uniqueness and efficiency of the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE)
outcome are retained for general deterministic procedures (Lemma 6 and Theorem
1). The alternating offers procedure can thus be generalized without losing its
theoretical attraction.
Furthermore, in Section 5 we try to determine the influence of the bargaining
procedure on the bargaining outcome. More specifically, we examine which payoff
4For example, see Binmore et al. (1986) and Binmore (1987) for some discussions on how the
subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes can be affected by players’ time preference.
3
outcomes could be supported in SPE by some general procedures. It turns out
that all efficient payoff outcomes can be supported in SPE if δA+δB ≥ 1 (Theorem
2); while almost no outcomes can be supported in SPE if δA + δB < 1, in the sense
that the measure of the set of SPE outcomes is zero (Theorem 3).
2 Bargaining with deterministic procedures
Two players, A and B, bargain to divide a pie that is perfectly divisible. Time is
discrete, and can be denoted by period t = 1, 2, · · · . The constant discount factor
of player i is δi ∈ [0, 1), i = A,B.
We define a deterministic procedure of the bargaining game, denoted by
ω = (ω1, ω2, . . . , ωk, . . .),
to be a sequence of A’s and B’s, where ωk = A or B denotes the kth element
of the sequence. A procedure ω can be finite or infinite. Let T (ω) denote the
number of elements ω contains. That is, if ω is finite, then it can be written as
ω = (ω1, ω2, . . . , ωT (ω)); if ω is infinite, then T (ω) =∞.
The bargaining takes place according to the procedure, which is exogenously
given and is common knowledge to both players. Given the procedure ω, in period
t = 1 the initial proposer ω1 makes an offer from the agreement set
D = {(dA, dB) | dA, dB ≥ 0, dA + dB = 1},
where dA and dB are the respective shares of the pie A and B get in the agreement.
The other player decides whether to accept or reject this offer. By induction, if an
offer is rejected in some period t = k ≤ T (ω) − 1, then the game proceeds to the
next period t = k+1 when proposer ωk+1 makes an offer from D and her opponent
responds. Once an offer d = (dA, dB) is accepted in period t, the game ends and
the accepted agreement is enforced. Each player i’s payoff ui(di, t) = δ
t−1
i di is her
share of the pie in this agreement discounted to t = 1. If no agreement is ever
accepted in all periods t ≤ T (ω), both players receive a payoff of zero.
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For notational simplicity, a procedure
ω = (j1, · · · , j1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n1
, j2, · · · , j2︸ ︷︷ ︸
n2
, j3, · · · , j3︸ ︷︷ ︸
n3
, · · · )
can be written as ω = jn11 j
n2
2 j
n3
3 · · · , where jk = A,B, jk 6= jk−1, and nk is the
length of the kth group of one-player successive offering periods. This procedure
can also be denoted by ω = j1[n1, n2, n3, . . .], where j1 = ω1 is the initial proposer.
For example, ω = A3B2 = A[3, 2] is a procedure of five periods, in the first three
of which A is the proposer (ω1 = ω2 = ω3 = A), while B proposes in the next two
periods (ω4 = ω5 = B). In particular, if ω is an infinite procedure and nk = 1, ∀k,
then ω is the alternating offers procedure discussed by Rubinstein (1982).
Let Ωi denote the set of all procedures whose initial proposers are ω1 = i
(i = A,B), and let Ω = ΩA ∪ ΩB be the set of all procedures. Given procedure
ω ∈ Ω and discount factors δA, δB, the bargaining game defined above is denoted
by G(ω, δA, δB).
Given any ω ∈ Ω and any k ≤ T (ω), let ω(k) denote the subprocedure of ω
starting from ωk. In other words, suppose now that the bargaining has come to
period t = k, then ω(k) is the part of ω that starts at period k. For example,
suppose ω = A2B3A, then ω(3) = B3A. An infinite procedure ω is said to be
stationary, if there exists an integer k ≥ 2 such that ω(nk) = ω for all integers n ≥
1. It is obvious that an infinite horizon alternating offers procedure is stationary.
Each player i’s strategy in a game G(ω, δA, δB), denoted by Si, specifies the
action i will take in any time of the game, given the history by that time. More
specifically, when it is i’s turn to propose, Si specifies which agreement she will
offer; when j is the proposer, Si specifies which response (accept or reject) i will
make to j’s offer, where i, j = A,B, i 6= j. Following Rubinstein (1982) and many
others, this paper uses subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE for short) to predict
the outcome of the game G(ω, δA, δB). An SPE of G(ω, δA, δB) is a strategy pair
S = (SA, SB) that induces a Nash equilibrium in each subgame.
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3 Technical preparation
Note that if the procedure ω = jn11 j
n2
2 · · · jnkk has finite groups of one-player suc-
cessive offering periods, then nk (the length of the last group’s offering periods)
is irrelevant to SPE payoffs. This is straightforward since during the last group
of offering periods, any SPE always involves the proposer suggesting the agree-
ment in which her own share is one, and the other player accepting this offer.
Thus, we may regard two procedures that only differ in the length of the last
group’s offering periods as essentially identical. For simplicity, hereafter we sup-
pose that the last group of one-player offering periods of each finite procedure
contains only one period. That is, if ω is a finite procedure, then it can be written
as ω = jn11 j
n2
2 · · · jnkk jk+1 = j1[n1, n2, . . . , nk, 1]. Similarly, suppose each infinite
procedure contains infinitely many groups of one-player offering periods; in other
words, we preclude the case ω = jn11 j
n2
2 · · · jnkk j∞k+1, since it is essentially identical
to ω = jn11 j
n2
2 · · · jnkk jk+1.
We introduce the following notations for future convenience. Given a finite or
infinite procedure ω = jn11 j
n2
2 · · · , let
r(ω) =

0, if ω = A or ω = B
m, if ω = jn11 j
n2
2 · · · jnmm jm+1
∞, if ω is infinite
.
That is, the identity of the proposer changes r(ω) times throughout ω. In other
words, there are r(ω) + 1 groups of one-player successive offering periods in ω.
Furthermore, given procedure ω = jn11 j
n2
2 · · · and nonnegative integer k ≤ r(ω),
define
p(ω, k) =
{
1, if k = 0
σn11 σ
n2
2 · · ·σnkk , if k = 1, 2, . . . , r(ω)
,
where σi = δA, if ji = B; σi = δB, if ji = A. Finally, write
θ(ω) =
r(ω)∑
k=0
(−1)kp(ω, k). (1)
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As an example, suppose ω1 = B[n1, n2, n3, n4, 1], then r(ω
1) = 4, and
θ(ω1) = 1− δn1A + δn1A δn2B − δn1+n3A δn2B + δn1+n3A δn2+n4B .
In addition, suppose ω2 = A[1, 1, . . .] is an infinite alternating offers procedure,
then
θ(ω2) = 1− δB + δBδA − δ2BδA + δ2Bδ2A − δ3Bδ2A + · · · =
1− δB
1− δAδB . (2)
We list some properties of p(ω, k) and θ(ω) below. These will be useful for
future analysis. Roughly speaking, these properties suggest that θ(ω) is a well-
defined partition of the pie (Lemma 1, 4); that this partition changes if one player
offers for an additional period (Lemma 5); and that the elements in the sequence
{zr : r = 1, . . . , r(ω)} where zr =
∑r
k=0(−1)kp(ω, k) are alternately larger and
smaller than θ(ω) (Lemma 2, 3).
Lemma 1. If r(ω) = ∞, then ∑∞k=t(−1)kp(ω, k) is absolutely convergent for all
t ≥ 0.
Proof. Let δ = max{δA, δB} < 1. For all t ≥ 0, the series
∑∞
k=t δ
k is con-
vergent. Since 0 < p(ω, k) ≤ δ∑ki=1 ni ≤ δk, we know by the comparison test
that
∑∞
k=t p(ω, k) is also convergent. Thus
∑∞
k=t(−1)kp(ω, k) is absolutely conver-
gent.
Lemma 2. Suppose t < r ≤ r(ω). If t is odd, then −p(ω, t) <∑rk=t(−1)kp(ω, k) <
0; if t is even, then 0 <
∑r
k=t(−1)kp(ω, k) < p(ω, t).
Proof. We shall only prove the case r =∞, since the proof of the case r <∞ is sim-
ilar. According to Lemma 1, we can rearrange the elements of
∑∞
k=t(−1)kp(ω, k)
without affecting the sum of this series. Assume without loss of generality that t
is even. Then
0 < [p(ω, t)− p(ω, t+ 1)] + [p(ω, t+ 2)− p(ω, t+ 3)] + · · · =
∞∑
k=t
(−1)kp(ω, k)
= p(ω, t)− [p(ω, t+ 1)− p(ω, t+ 2)]− [p(ω, t+ 3)− p(ω, t+ 4)]− · · · < p(ω, t),
which is exactly what we want to prove.
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Lemma 3. Given r ≤ r(ω), let zr =
∑r
k=0(−1)kp(ω, k). For any t < s ≤ r(ω), if
t is odd, then zt < zs; if t is even, then zt > zs.
Proof. Since zt =
∑t
k=0(−1)kp(ω, k) = zs−
∑s
k=t+1(−1)kp(ω, k), we can prove the
conclusion directly from Lemma 2.
Lemma 4. For any ω ∈ Ω, 0 ≤ θ(ω) ≤ 1.
Proof. Suppose without loss of generality that ω = An1Bn2 · · · ∈ ΩA. If r(ω) = 0,
then θ(ω) = 1. If r(ω) = 1, then θ(ω) = 1 − δn1B . If r(ω) ≥ 2, then according to
Lemma 3, we have 0 < 1− δn1B = z1 < θ(ω) = zr(ω) < z0 = 1.
Lemma 5. Suppose ω1, ω2 ∈ Ω, r(ω2) = r(ω1) + 1; there exists an integer t ≥ 2
such that ω2k = ω
1
k, for all k = 1, . . . , t− 1; ω2k = ω1k−1, for all k = t+ 1, . . . , r(ω2).
Then θ(ω2) > θ(ω1) if ω2t = ω
1
1, while θ(ω
2) < θ(ω1) if ω2t 6= ω11.
Proof. Without loss of generality, suppose ω1 = An1 · · ·Bns−1AnsBns+1 · · · , and
ω2 = An1 · · ·Bns−1Ans+1Bns+1 · · · . According to (1), θ(ω2) = ∑r(ω2)k=0 (−1)kp(ω2, k)
=
∑s−1
k=0(−1)kp(ω1, k) + δB
∑r(ω1)
k=s (−1)kp(ω1, k), whereas
∑r(ω1)
k=s (−1)kp(ω1, k) < 0
due to Lemma 2. Hence, θ(ω2) >
∑s−1
k=0(−1)kp(ω1, k) +
∑r(ω1)
k=s (−1)kp(ω1, k) =∑r(ω1)
k=0 (−1)kp(ω1, k) = θ(ω1).
4 Subgame perfect equilibrium
In this section, we examine the subgame perfect equilibria of bargaining games
with deterministic procedures. We first establish that in any SPE the bargaining
in G(ω, δA, δB) will end by its first period. Therefore, there is no delay in SPE,
and SPE outcomes, if they exist, must be efficient5.
Lemma 6. Suppose a bargaining game G(ω, δA, δB) has come to some period, then
in any SPE, the offer proposed in that period must be accepted.
Proof. First note that if ω is finite and the game has come to the last period T (ω),
then in SPE the offer proposed in this period must be accepted. Now for any
finite or infinite ω, suppose the bargaining has come to period k1 ≤ T (ω)− 1. We
5In this paper, a payoff outcome (uA, uB) where ui ≥ 0 is said to be efficient if uA + uB = 1.
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assume for a contradiction that in some SPE, S = (SA, SB), the offer in period k1
is rejected. Then either some agreement is reached in some period t > k1, or no
agreement is ever reached in finite time (when ω is infinite).
In the first case, there is an integer k, 1 ≤ k ≤ T (ω)− k1, such that according
to S the offers in periods k1, k1 + 1, . . . , k1 + k− 1 are all rejected, but the offer d∗
proposed in period k1 + k is accepted. Suppose the proposer i in period k1 + k− 1
proposes an agreement d′ in which j gets δjx+ ε and i gets 1− δjx− ε, where x is
j’s share in d∗, and 0 < ε < min{1 − δA, 1 − δB}. It is obvious that j will accept
d′ in period k1 + k − 1 according to Sj, since otherwise he is worse off by getting
x in period k1 + k. Since the offer in period k1 + k − 1 is rejected, player i would
not propose d′ according to Si. This implies 1 − δjx − ε ≤ δi(1 − x), and hence
ε ≥ 1− δi + (δi− δj)x, which contradicts the assumption ε < min{1− δA, 1− δB}.
In the second case, we can similarly prove that the proposer i in period k1 has
an incentive to deviate from Si and to propose an agreement (for example, j gets
ρ and i gets 1−ρ, where δj < ρ < 1) which will be accepted by j. This contradicts
the assumption that S is an SPE, and completes the proof.
The following theorem shows that for each bargaining game with a determin-
istic procedure G(ω, δA, δB), there is a unique SPE payoff outcome, in which the
initial proposer ω1’s payoff is θ(ω).
Theorem 1. There exists a unique pair (x, 1−x) that can be supported as an SPE
outcome of G(ω, δA, δB), where x = θ(ω) if ω ∈ ΩA, and x = 1− θ(ω) if ω ∈ ΩB.
Proof. See the appendix.
Note that if ω = A[1, 1, . . .] is an infinite-horizon alternating offers procedure,
then it follows from (2) that θ(ω) = 1−δB
1−δAδB . Hence, Theorem 1 can be regarded
as a generalization of Rubinstein (1982)’s main theorem for the special case of
constant discount factors. In fact, one contribution of Theorem 1 is that it suggests
that the existence and uniqueness of the SPE outcome does not depend on the
stationary structure of the alternating offers procedure, and can be extended to
non-stationary bargaining procedures as well.
Shaked and Sutton (1984) suggests that when δA = δB = δ, each player’s SPE
payoff in an alternating offers bargaining game is basically the discounted sum
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of all those pieces of pie that shrink (at a speed of δ) while that player is the
proposer. It follows from Theorem 1 that this intuitive statement remains true
for all deterministic bargaining procedures. As an example, consider ω = A2B3A,
then the SPE partition is (1− δ2 + δ5, δ2− δ5). Suppose that the size of the pie is
one in period 1; in each period k, 1 < k ≤ 6, the pie is δ times as large as that in
period k − 1; in period k > 6, the size is zero. If B rejects A’s offers in periods 1
and 2, the size of the pie will decrease by 1 − δ2; if A’s offer is rejected in period
6, the remaining pie (of size δ5) will disappear. Hence, 1− δ2 + δ5 is the total size
of the pie that shrinks while A is the proposer.
Moreover, Theorem 1 may serve as a basis for analyzing the influence of bar-
gaining procedure on the bargaining outcome. This is the main task of the next
section. For example, Theorem 1 and Lemma 5 together imply that a player’s SPE
payoff increases as she gains one additional offering period in a new procedure.
5 The measure of SPE payoff outcomes
In this section, we mainly focus on the converse of Theorem 1. That is, given δA
and δB, can an efficient partition of the pie (x, 1 − x) be supported as an SPE
outcome? The following theorem suggests that when δA + δB ≥ 1, any efficient
partition can be supported as an SPE outcome by some procedure. The proof in
appendix illustrates how to explicitly construct such a procedure.
Theorem 2. Suppose δA+ δB ≥ 1, then for any x ∈ [0, 1], there exists ω ∈ Ω such
that the SPE payoff pair supported by ω is (x, 1− x).
Proof. See the appendix.
The condition δA + δB ≥ 1 in Theorem 2 is essential. In fact, if δA + δB < 1,
then there are some (x, 1−x) that cannot be supported in SPE by any procedure.
For example, each ω ∈ ΩA will result in the SPE payoff pair (x, 1 − x) such that
x ≥ 1− δB,6 while each ω ∈ ΩB will lead to (x, 1− x) such that x ≤ δA. Hence, if
δA + δB < 1 and x ∈ (δA, 1− δB), then (x, 1− x) cannot be supported in SPE by
any procedure ω ∈ Ω.
6Suppose ω = An1Bn2 · · · , then according to Lemma 3 and Theorem 1, x = θ(ω) = zr(ω) ≥
z1 = 1− δn1B ≥ 1− δB if r(ω) ≥ 1; x = θ(ω) = 1 > 1− δB if r(ω) = 0.
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Furthermore, we are interested in “how many” payoff divisions can ever be
supported as SPE outcomes. Given δA and δB, let
Γ(δA, δB) =
{
x ∈ [0, 1] | ∃ω ∈ Ω, s.t. SPE outcome is (x, 1− x)}
be the set of player A’s share of the pie in all SPE payoff divisions. Let m[Q] denote
the (Lebesgue) measure of a measurable setQ ⊂ R. If Γ(δA, δB) is measurable, then
m[Γ(δA, δB)] measures the scale of SPE payoff divisions. Since Γ(δA, δB) ⊂ [0, 1],
we have 0 ≤ m[Γ(δA, δB)] ≤ 1 if Γ(δA, δB) is measurable.
It follows from Theorem 2 that if δA + δB ≥ 1, then Γ(δA, δB) = [0, 1], and thus
m[Γ(δA, δB)] = 1. On the contrary, the next theorem establishes that if δA+δB < 1,
then Γ(δA, δB) is also measurable, but its measure is zero. It suggests that almost
no partitions of the pie can ever be supported in SPE if δA + δB < 1.
Theorem 3. Suppose δA + δB < 1, then m[Γ(δA, δB)] = 0.
Proof. See the appendix.
The contrast between Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 has an intuitive explanation.
When players are relatively impatient (δA + δB < 1), different procedures are
less capable of yielding different bargaining outcomes than in the situations with
sufficiently patient players (δA+δB ≥ 1), since impatient players care less about the
arrangement of future procedures and are less sensitive to a change in procedure.
As a possible application of these conclusions, suppose there is a designer who
tries to achieve his ideal payoff division (x∗, 1 − x∗) by designing a deterministic
bargaining procedure. To an outside observer, x∗ is an ex ante random variable,
which is uniformly distributed over [0, 1]. It follows from Theorem 2 and Theorem
3 that from the outside observer’s view, with probability one the designer can
“implement” his ideal payoff division if δA + δB ≥ 1, while the corresponding
probability is zero if δA + δB < 1. Hence, m[Γ(δA, δB)] can be regarded as the
outside observer’s estimation of the designer’s control power over the bargaining
outcome. In particular, when δA + δB is close to 1, a designer who has full control
over all bargaining outcomes may, after a slight perturbation of discount factors,
suddenly lose almost all his power in determining any specific outcome.
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6 Conclusion
This paper focuses on the role bargaining procedures play in a bilateral nonco-
operative bargaining model. We consider natural extensions and generalizations
of the alternating offers procedure. We explore the potential of these generalized
procedures to achieve a particular bargaining outcome, and also investigate the
limitations of these procedures.
The theoretical contribution of this paper is two-fold. First, we show that a
bargaining game with any deterministic procedure has a unique subgame perfect
equilibrium outcome, which is efficient. Second, all efficient partitions of the pie
can be supported as SPE outcomes by some procedures if players are sufficiently
patient; while only a degenerate set of partitions can be supported in SPE if players
are impatient.
Finally, we list here some extensions that might be worth exploring in future
research. First, it might be helpful to discuss the endogenously determination of
the bargaining procedure. Second, the general bargaining game under incomplete
information might be very complex but also interesting. Third, the analysis can
be extended to bargaining games with more than two players.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1.
By symmetry, we only consider ω ∈ ΩA. The theorem can be easily proved if
ω = A, so we only consider procedures ω such that r(w) ≥ 1.
First define a strategy pair S∗ = (S∗A, S
∗
B) as follows. When the game comes
to period s, for any history, the proposer ωs = i proposes θ(ω(s)) as the share
for herself and 1 − θ(ω(s)) as the share for her opponent j 6= i according to S∗i ;
the other player j accepts any offer in which the proposer’s share is no more than
θ(ω(s)) and rejects all other offers according to S∗j . It is obvious that if players
follow S∗, then the game will end by period t = 1 with agreement
(
θ(ω), 1−θ(ω)).
We shall prove that S∗ is an SPE of G(ω, δA, δB), and
(
θ(ω), 1− θ(ω)) is the only
payoff pair that could ever be supported in SPE.
In order to show that S∗ is an SPE, it is sufficient to verify that S∗ satisfies
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the one-shot deviation principle, which asserts that a strategy profile S is an SPE
of an extensive game with constant discount factors, if and only if no player can
ever become strictly better off by deviating from S for just one period and then
reverting to S7. Suppose the game has come to period t = s. If the proposer
ωs, without loss of generality assumed to be A, deviates from S
∗
A and suggests
an offer in which her own share is y1,s > x1,s, then player B will reject this offer
according to S∗B and let the game enter period s+ 1. If ωs+1 = A, then A will get
v(s + 1) = θ(ω(s + 1)) in period s + 1 according to S∗; if ωs+1 = B, then A will
get v(s+ 1) = 1− θ(ω(s+ 1)) in period s+ 1. In either case, if δB > 0, we have
θ(ω(s)) = 1 +
r(ω(s))∑
k=1
(−1)kp(ω(s), k)
> 1 +
1
δB
r(ω(s))∑
k=1
(−1)kp(ω(s), k)
= v(s+ 1) > δAv(s+ 1),
where
∑r(ω(s))
k=1 (−1)kp(ωs, k) < 0 due to Lemma 2; if δB = 0, then θ(ω(s)) = 1,
thus we also have θ(ω(s)) > δAv(s+ 1) due to Lemma 4. This implies that A has
no incentive to increase her own share in the offer in period s, since otherwise her
payoff will decline from uA(θ(ω(s)), s) to uA(v(s + 1), s + 1). On the other hand,
it is obvious that A will also not decrease her own share in the offer in period s.
Similarly, we can show that B will neither increase nor decrease her reservation
share 1− θ(ω(s)) for accepting an offer proposed by A in period s. Thus we have
proved S∗ satisfies the one-shot deviation principle, and hence is an SPE.
Now we turn to the uniqueness part of the theorem, using a technique intro-
duced by Shaked and Sutton (1984). Given i = 0, 1, . . . , r(ω), let Λi be a subset of
[0, 1] so that for each x ∈ Λi, there exists an SPE of G(ω, δA, δB) such that in this
SPE, when the game has come to period ti =
∑i
j=0 nj + 1 (where n0 = 0) the pro-
poser suggests an agreement in which his own share is x and his opponent’s share
is 1− x. Let Mi and mi denote the supremum and infimum of Λi, respectively.
In period n1 + 1 player B can get no more than M1 in any SPE. Hence, A will
7See, for example, Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, section 4.2).
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offer B no more than δBM1 in period n1, no more than δ
2
BM1 in period n1− 1, ...,
no more than δn1B M1 in period 1. Thus m0 ≥ 1− δn1B M1. Similarly, we have
mj−1 ≥ 1− δnjj Mj, j = 1, . . . , r(ω), (3)
where δj = δA if j is even, and δj = δB if j is odd.
If player B rejects A’s offers in period t = 1, . . . , n1, he will get no less than m1
in period n1 + 1 in any SPE. Thus due to Lemma 6, A will offer B no less than
δn1B m1 in period t = 1. Hence M0 ≤ 1− δn1B m1. Similarly, we have
Mj−1 ≤ 1− δnjj mj, j = 1, . . . , r(ω), (4)
where δj = δA if j is even, and δj = δB if j is odd.
If ω is finite, by repeatedly using (3) and (4), we have
m0 ≥ 1− δn1B M1 ≥ 1− δn1B + δn1B δn2A m2 ≥ 1− δn1B + δn1B δn2A − δn1+n3B δn2A M3
≥ · · · ≥
r(ω)−1∑
k=0
(−1)kp(ω, k) + (−1)r(ω)p(ω, r(ω))mr(ω),
M0 ≤ 1− δn1B m1 ≤ 1− δn1B + δn1B δn2A M2 ≤ 1− δn1B + δn1B δn2A − δn1+n3B δn2A m3
≤ · · · ≤
r(ω)−1∑
k=0
(−1)kp(ω, k) + (−1)r(ω)p(ω, r(ω))mr(ω),
where mr(ω) = mr(ω), mr(ω) = Mr(ω) if r(ω) is even, and mr(ω) = Mr(ω), mr(ω) =
mr(ω) if r(ω) is odd. However, in the last period of the game tr(ω) = T (ω), in
any SPE the proposer always suggests the agreement in which her own share
is one. Hence mr(ω) = Mr(ω) = 1. Since m0 ≤ M0, we have m0 = M0 =∑r(ω)
k=0(−1)kp(ω, k) = θ(ω).
If ω is infinite, we can similarly get
j−1∑
k=0
(−1)kp(ω, k)+(−1)jp(ω, j)mj ≤ m0 ≤M0 ≤
j−1∑
k=0
(−1)kp(ω, k)+(−1)jp(ω, j)mj
for each j ≥ 1, where mj = mj, mj = Mj if j is even, and mj = Mj, mj = mj if
j is odd. Note that limj→∞(−1)jp(ω, j)mj = limj→∞(−1)jp(ω, j)mj = 0. Due to
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Lemma 1, let j → ∞, we have m0 = M0 =
∑∞
k=0(−1)kp(ω, k) = θ(ω). Hence we
have proved the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 2.
I shall only prove that for any x ∈ [1−δB, 1], there exists ω ∈ ΩA such that the
payoff pair supported in SPE by ω is (x, 1− x). For any x ∈ [0, 1− δB) ⊂ [0, δA),
a similar proof applies for ω ∈ ΩB.
We can construct a procedure ω ∈ ΩA inductively as follows. If x = 1, then
ω = A suffices for the proof. Otherwise, we have 1 − δB ≤ x < 1. Let n1 be the
maximal integer such that 1− δn1B is not greater than x. That is,
1− δn1B ≤ x < 1− δn1+1B . (5)
If the equality in (5) holds, that is, x = 1 − δn1B , we can implement (x, 1 − x) as
an SPE outcome by ω = A[n1, 1]. Otherwise, we have 1− δn1B < x < 1− δn1+1B . In
this case, let n2 be the maximal integer such that 1− δn1B + δn2A δn1B is not less than
x. That is,
1− δn1B + δn2+1A δn1B < x ≤ 1− δn1B + δn2A δn1B . (6)
If the equality in (6) holds, that is, x = 1−δn1B +δn2A δn1B , we can implement (x, 1−x)
as an SPE outcome by ω = A[n1, n2, 1]. Otherwise, we have 1− δn1B + δn2+1A δn1B <
x < 1− δn1B + δn2A δn1B , and should continue to construct ω.
Now, suppose by induction that n1, n2, . . . , nr have already been defined, where
r ≥ 2. If x = ∑rk=0(−1)kp(ω, k), (x, 1 − x) can be supported in SPE by ω =
A[n1, n2, . . . , nr, 1]. Otherwise, if r is odd, then
r∑
k=0
(−1)kp(ω, k) < x <
r−1∑
k=0
(−1)kp(ω, k)− δBp(ω, r), (7)
while if r is even, then
r−1∑
k=0
(−1)kp(ω, k) + δAp(ω, r) < x <
r∑
k=0
(−1)kp(ω, k).
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In either case, we need to define nr+1. If r is odd, let nr+1 be the integer such that
r∑
k=0
(−1)kp(ω, k) + δAp(ω, r + 1) < x ≤
r+1∑
k=0
(−1)kp(ω, k). (8)
If r is even, let nr+1 be the integer such that
r+1∑
k=0
(−1)kp(ω, k) ≤ x <
r∑
k=0
(−1)kp(ω, k)− δBp(ω, r + 1). (9)
We need to show that nr+1 is well defined, that is, there exists exactly one
integer nr+1 such that (8) or (9) holds. If r is odd,
∑r+1
k=0(−1)kp(ω, k) is decreasing
in nr+1. When nr+1 = 1, according to (7) we have
r+1∑
k=0
(−1)kp(ω, k) =
r∑
k=0
(−1)kp(ω, k) + δAp(ω, r)
≥
r∑
k=0
(−1)kp(ω, k) + (1− δB)p(ω, r)
=
r−1∑
k=0
(−1)kp(ω, k)− δBp(ω, r) > x,
while as nr+1 → ∞,
∑r+1
k=0(−1)kp(ω, k) →
∑r
k=0(−1)kp(ω, k) < x. Thus, there
exists a unique integer nr+1 that satisfies (8), that is, nr+1 is well defined. Similarly,
we can prove nr+1 is well defined if r is even. We have thus finished defining nr+1.
Given x ∈ [1 − δB, 1], if there exists an integer h such that for n1, n2, . . . , nh
defined above, x =
∑h
k=0(−1)kp(ω, k), then from Theorem 1, the payoff pair (x, 1−
x) can be supported as an SPE outcome by ω = A[n1, n2, . . . , nh, 1]. If such a finite
sequence of integers cannot be found, we will eventually get an infinite sequence
n1, n2, . . . and a corresponding infinite procedure ω = A[n1, n2, . . .]. Let
zr =
r∑
k=0
(−1)kp(ω, k), r = 1, 2, . . . .
The elements in the sequence {z1, z2, . . .} are alternately larger and smaller than
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x. According to Lemma 1, this sequence converges, and thus its limit is x. That is,
x =
∑∞
k=0(−1)kp(ω, k). It follows form Theorem 1 that (x, 1−x) can be supported
as an SPE outcome by ω. Thus, we have proved the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 3.
The proof of the theorem proceeds in steps.
Step 1: We shall show (δA, 1 − δB) ∩ Γ(δA, δB) = ∅, that is, if δA < x <
1 − δB, then there does not exist ω ∈ Ω such that (x, 1 − x) can be supported
as an SPE outcome by ω. Suppose, on the contrary, that we can find such a
procedure ω, and assume without loss of generality that ω ∈ ΩA. According to
Theorem 1 and Lemma 3, x = θ(ω) =
∑r(ω)
k=0(−1)kp(ω, k) ≥ 1 − δn1B ≥ 1 − δB,
which contradicts x < 1 − δB. Thus (δA, 1 − δB) ∩ Γ(δA, δB) = ∅. Therefore
m[Γ(δA, δB)] ≤ 1−m[(δA, 1− δB)] = δA + δB.
Step 2: We shall first prove that (1−δB+δBδA, 1−δ2B)∩Γ(δA, δB) = ∅. Suppose,
on the contrary, that we can find x ∈ (1− δB + δBδA, 1− δ2B) and ω ∈ Ω such that
(x, 1− x) can be supported as an SPE outcome by ω. Since x > 1− δB, we have
ω ∈ ΩA, that is, ω1 = 1. Again, due to Theorem 1 and Lemma 3, if ω2 = 1, then
x ≥ 1 − δn1B ≥ 1 − δ2B; if ω2 = 2, then x ≤ 1 − δB + δBδn2A ≤ 1 − δB + δBδA. This
contradicts x ∈ (1−δB+δBδA, 1−δ2B). Thus (1−δB+δBδA, 1−δ2B)∩Γ(δA, δB) = ∅.
Similarly, we can prove (δ2A, δA − δBδA) ∩ Γ(δA, δB) = ∅. Hence, m[Γ(δA, δB)] ≤
δA + δB −m[(1− δB + δBδA, 1− δ2B)]−m[(δ2A, δA − δBδA)] = (δA + δB)2.
Assume by induction that by the first k ≥ 1 steps, we have deleted the
following 2k − 1 disjoint intervals from Γ(δA, δB): A11 = (δA, 1 − δB), A21 =
(δ2A, δA − δBδA), A22 = (1 − δB + δBδA, 1 − δ2B), Ak1 = (δkA, δk−1A (1 − δB)), · · · ,
Ak
2k−1 = (1− δk−1B (1− δA), 1− δkB). There remain 2k intervals, whose total measure
is 1−∑ks=1∑2k−1i=1 m[Asi ] = (δA + δB)k. Thus m[Γ(δA, δB)] ≤ (δA + δB)k.
Now at step k + 1, we further delete 2k disjoint intervals Ak+1i , i = 1, . . . , 2
k,
from Γ(δA, δB). More specifically, in each remaining interval [Pi, Qi] after step k,
we delete Ak+1i =
(
Pi + δA(Qi− Pi), Qi− δB(Qi− Pi)
)
. There remain two disjoint
intervals in [Pi, Qi]: [Pi, Pi + δA(Qi − Pi)] and [Qi − δB(Qi − Pi), Qi], whose total
measure is (δA + δB)(Qi − Pi). Therefore, after step k + 1, there remain 2k+1
intervals, whose total measure is (δA + δB)
k+1.
To show m[Γ(δA, δB)] ≤ (δA + δB)k+1, we still have to prove that Ak+1i ∩
17
Γ(δA, δB) = ∅, i = 1, . . . , 2k. Without loss of generality, we only consider Ak+11 =(
δk+1A , δ
k
A(1 − δB)
) ⊂ [P1, Q1] = [0, δkA]. Suppose, on the contrary, that we can
find x ∈ Ak+11 and ω ∈ Ω such that (x, 1 − x) can be supported as an SPE out-
come by ω. Since 0 < x < δA < 1 − δB, we may write ω = B[n1, n2, . . .], then
x = δn1A − δn1A δn2B + · · · . If n1 ≥ k + 1, then x < δn1A ≤ δk+1A , which contradicts
x > δk+1A . If n1 ≤ k, then x ≥ δn1A (1 − δn2B ) ≥ δkA(1 − δB), which contradicts
x < δkA(1− δB). Thus Ak+11 ∩ Γ(δA, δB) = ∅.
Hence, we have proved m[Γ(δA, δB)] ≤ (δA + δB)k, ∀k ≥ 1. Since δA + δB < 1,
we have (δA + δB)
k → 0 as k →∞. Thus m[Γ(δA, δB)] = 0.
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